We present a model incorporating both social and economic components, and analyze their interaction. The notion of a social asset, an attribute that has value only because of the social institutions governing society, is introduced. In the basic model, agents match on the basis of income and unproductive attributes. An attribute has value in some equilibrium social institutions (matching patterns), but not in others. We then show that productive attributes (such as education) can have their value increased above their inherent productive value by some social institutions, leading to the notion of the social value of an asset.
Introduction
Nearly all economic decisions have a social component. Individuals care about social characteristics such as status, honor, or popularity. Even when individuals only care about "economic" variables, the nature of interactions that facilitate economic activity are themselves at least partially social in nature. This social "context" must be taken into account when studying many economic problems. If status, honor or popularity are important to an individual, predictions about labor market response to taxes or bonuses that ignore these considerations will be less accurate than predictions that consider these factors.
In this paper, we continue our interest (begun in Cole, Mailath, and Postlewaite (1992) and Cole, Mailath, and Postlewaite (1998) ) in understanding the impact of economic considerations on the social environment. These papers, which focused on equilibrium social institutions with personalized enforcement mechanisms, investigate social norms that solve social dilemmas in the presence of incentives for opportunistic behavior. In these social institutions, an individual who violated the accepted norms of behavior is "punished" (in an incentive compatible way). 1 Social institutions can also a¤ect the value of assets without the use of personalized enforcement. More speci…cally, since there is a range of possible social institutions, assets no longer need have a value independent of governing institutions. Since di¤erent social institutions can create di¤erent incentives for a variety of economically relevant behaviors and decisions, assets that have little (or no) value under some social institutions may have positive value under others. The qualitative nature of these incentives di¤er from those that arise with personalized enforcement, and give rise to the social value of an asset. An agent may have a number of assets, the possession of which lead to higher utility than would be possible without them. Examples include both alienable assets that can be transferred to other people, such as machines or money, and inalienable assets that cannot be transferred -human capital. For a …xed set of preferences and technology, an asset may or may not have productive value. A machine that can produce radios and a bel canto ("beautiful singing") voice both have productive value. Other assets have no direct productive value, yet their possession may lead to higher utility. For example, it may be that in a particular society agents with lighter skin or a particular accent enjoy higher consumption than those with darker skin or a less desirable accent, even when those attributes have no productive value per se. We refer to an attribute of an agent that has value only because of a social institution as a social asset. The social value of an asset is that part of an asset's value that stems from the social institutions, that is, the part of the value beyond that attributable to the asset's productive value.
We introduce a model that combines both the social and the traditional economic aspects of society in a manner that allows for an analysis of the interaction between the social environment and agents' decisions. We consider a generational model in which men and women match and have children. Income is random and nonstorable, men and women match, and then jointly consume their income. People get utility from their own consumption and their descendants' consumption. An individual's sole decision is the identity of his or her partner.
Since consumption is joint, a wealthier partner leads to higher consumption. There will then be equilibria in which each person's wealth determines his or her match. In addition to equilibria of this kind, there may be additional equilibria in which nonproductive attributes a¤ect matching. In particular, in equilibrium, attributes that have no fundamental value can have instrumental value. Individuals care about their children's consumption, which depends on the children's (random) income. We assume it is not possible to insure against this risk. There are thus two reasons why outcomes are not fully e¢cient: parents would like to insure against the consumption risk their children face, and rich parents would like to transfer consumption to their children, neither of which is possible. This allows the possibility that social institutions may arise that ameliorate the resulting ine¢ciency.
Suppose there is a heritable attribute that is independent of income, blue eyes for example, and suppose further the attribute does not enter people's utility functions. Suppose, nevertheless, that in this society people with blue eyes are considered desirable mates, that is, that people are willing to match with a person who has blue eyes with slightly less income than with a person without blue eyes. In such a society, people will naturally prefer their children to have blue eyes since, all else equal, they consume more. But if they prefer children with blue eyes, and blue eyes are a heritable attribute, they will naturally prefer mates with blue eyes. In other words, a preference for blue eyes may be self-ful…lling. Notice that this has nothing to do with any intrinsic desirability for blue eyes; within this same society it could equally well have been that brown eyes were a desirable attribute. Any heritable attribute might serve as a social asset in this way. 2 If the social institutions make blue eyes a desirable attribute, we see that the degree of assortativeness of matching on wealth is decreased relative to the case that matching is on wealth alone. When there is no such desirable attribute, wealthy men match only with wealthy women and vice versa. When the social institutions value an attribute such as blue eyes, some wealthy short people match with less wealthy people with blue eyes. The consequence of social institutions that value such assets is that the variance of consumption in society is lower. When people are risk averse, the social institutions that value attributes that are fundamentally extraneous can be welfare superior to institutions that ignore such extraneous attributes. Separately from the insurance value, the attribute also allows a wealthy parent to transmit something of value to his o¤spring. This is desirable from a parent's point of view if the child's expected wealth is lower than the parent's, whether the child's wealth is risky or not.
The discussion above focuses on the case in which the attribute is nonproductive, that is, the attribute is completely independent of anything that enters directly into peoples' utility functions. An analogous situation can arise for productive attributes. Suppose that height is the attribute in question, and that it has a productive component; for example, a tall person may be able to reach the top shelves in a storage closet without getting a ladder, thereby being able to do some tasks more quickly than a short person. In such a scenario, height leads to a higher expected income. All people would naturally prefer tall partners in such a world, even if height did not enter directly into utility functions, since people would realize that the children they have with tall partners are more likely to have high income.
Even when the attribute has a productive component, it still may be possible to identify a social component of its value. Since it is productive, people will prefer partners with the attribute to those without, all other things equal. But if the productive advantage is small, there may be two stable matchings corresponding to those described above for the unproductive attribute case. One will have high income people without the attribute matching with like partners, and a second will have high income people without the attribute matching with low income people with the attribute. The situation is as before: it may be that the social institutions in the society are such that if others in society value the attribute above and beyond its productive value, then it is rational for each individual to do so as well.
We emphasize that we view this model as a parable rather than a serious model of marriage and investment in human capital. The model is designed to demonstrate how the social and economic components of society interact and the role of social assets in such a model. There are many models that accomplish these goals, and we chose the particularly simple one described above for expository ease. 3 The examples of social assets in the description and motivation above were characteristics or traits that were physically embodied in the individual such as accent or height. Some social assets may have such a physical manifestation, but it isn't necessary. For example, our conception of an individual's social assets includes the set of people that one knows personally.
In the next section, we formalize the model described above. In Section 3 we consider the case where the characteristics appear in half the population and where the transmission is "balanced" (so that the fraction with the characteristic is always a half). We provide conditions under which there are equilibria with nontrivial social assets, and we consider how such social assets can arise. We emphasized in the discussion above that a central concern in this paper was the analysis of the interaction between peoples' decisions and the social environment. In Section 4 we analyze how the social institutions within a society -that is, what assets have value -can endogenously change over time. Attributes that are not genetically transmitted, but are rather passed from parents to children socially, such as accents, manners, etc., are arguably even more important than genetically transmitted characteristics. Section 5 treats this more general case. Lastly, 3 An alternative, non-matching, model is discussed in Section 7.
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we drop the restriction that individuals can only a¤ect their future o¤springs' chances of acquiring the attribute through the choice of a mate. We extend our analysis in Section 6 to allow individuals access to a market to in ‡uence the chance their children will have desirable attributes, such as education. We conclude with a discussion section.
Model
There is an in…nite sequence of two-period lived agents, each of which consists of a continuum of men and women. There is a single non-storable consumption good. In each period, old men and women match and consume their combined wealth (so that the good is a public good within couples). 4 In addition, each couple has two o¤spring (one of each gender). The common consumption utility function for old agents is concave and denoted U : < ! <. Individuals care about their descendants' welfare: the utility to any matched couple is their utility from consumption plus the discounted average utility of their children, with common discount rate¯. This means, of course, that their utility depends on the consumption of all future generations.
While agents neither take actions nor receive utility in their …rst period of life, they may acquire an attribute. We assume (except in Section 6) that agents can only acquire this attribute through their parents: both o¤spring will have the attribute for sure if both parents possess the attribute, they will surely not have it if neither have it, and they will have it with probability ½ if one parent had the attribute. 5 For simplicity, we assume that either both o¤spring have the attribute, or neither does. Individuals with the attribute are y agents, while those without the attribute are n agents. This attribute does not enter into agents' utility functions. Education is an especially interesting attribute; we consider this attribute in Section 6, and allow parents to expend resources to increase the likelihood of their children having this attribute. At present, however, we assume the transmission is exogenous.
Each agent receives an endowment of the consumption good (income) at the beginning of their second period of life. This income is either high (H) or low (L). The attribute is possibly productive: the probability that a y agent has high income (H ) is 1 2 +k, and the probability an n agent has high income is 1 2 ¡ k, k¸0. The productivity of the attribute is captured by k; if k = 0, the attribute is nonproductive, and agents are equally likely to have high or low income.
We assume an agent's income is independent of the parents' incomes. Possible consumption levels for matched pairs are 2H; 2L and H + L: We normalize the utility function so that U (2L) = 0 and U (2H) = 1, and denote the utility of the third possible consumption level, H + L; by u; u 2 [ 1 2 ; 1) since U is concave. An agent's income level and the presence/absence of the attribute together constitute that agent's characteristic.
The only decision an agent makes in this economy (except in Section 6) concerns matching. A proposed matching is stable if no pair of agents can increase each of their utilities by matching, taking into account the consequences for their descendants (Roth and Sotomayer (1990) ). 6 Any matching induces a matching on agent characteristics in the obvious manner. A matching is strictly stable if, for each unmatched pair of agent characteristics, agents with these characteristics would strictly decrease their utilities by matching (taking into account the consequences for their descendants).
An allocation in a period is a pair (¹; m), where ¹´¡¹ y ; ¹ n ¢ is the distribution of attributes in the economy (¹ y is the fraction of men, and of women, with the attribute, and ¹ n = 1 ¡ ¹ y ), and m is the matching. Given ¹, the distribution of characteristics is determined by the productivity of the attribute, so that, for example, the fraction of the population with high income and the attribute is (
where ¹ t , the distribution of attributes in period t, is induced from the distribution of characteristics and matching in period t ¡1, and where the matching in each period is stable. Note that this notion of equilibrium is anonymous. Parents can only a¤ect the utility of their children through the characteristics they receive.
A Special Case
In this section and the next, we analyze the case where half the population has the attribute and transmission is balanced, i.e., ½ = 1 2 . This case is relatively straightforward to analyze for two reasons. First, with balanced transmission, the proportion of the population that has the attribute is independent of the matching. As a consequence, to analyze equilibrium, it is enough to describe the stable matchings. Second, when half the population has the attribute, the mixed matching is particularly simple, since all the Hn's match with all the Ly's. When the fraction of the population with the attribute is di¤erent from a half, there is rationing in the mixed matching, and the calculations become more complicated; we analyze this case in Section 5.
Stable Assortative Matching
If the attribute is unproductive, and the distribution over o¤spring characteristics is independent of parents' characteristics, any matching positively assortative on income will clearly be stable. If the attribute is productive, a matching that is positive assortative on income but not on attribute cannot be stable (since an Hy agent can do better by matching with another Hy agent than with an Hn agent). The assortative matching has high income men match with high income women and men with the attribute match with women with the attribute:
It will be convenient to work with average discounted value functions. If an agent has discount factor¯, the average discounted value of the stream of utilities fv t g 1 t=1 is P 1 t=1¯t ¡1 (1 ¡¯)v t . By rescaling ‡ow utility by the factor (1 ¡¯), a constant sequence of ‡ow utility v has average discounted value of v.
Denote by V A y the average discounted value function for agents who have the attribute when matching is assortative, evaluated before their income has been realized, and by V A n the value function of those who do not have the attribute. Note that while matching occurs after income is realized, since matching is assortative on attribute as well as income, if an agent has the attribute, then s/he will match with a partner who also has the attribute, and so their o¤spring has the attribute with probability 1. The uncertainty over current income translates into uncertainty only over current utility. Then,
(recall our normalization that U (2H) = 1 and U (2L) = 0). Solving for V A y gives
Similarly, we have
The value of having the attribute in this equilibrium is V A y ¡ V A n = 2k, which is the ‡ow value of the productivity of the attribute.
Consider now an Hn agent. If he or she matches according to the prescribed assortative matching, the resulting utility will be 1 ¡¯+¯V A n , since such a matching yields for sure children without the attribute. If this agent matches instead with an Ly agent, he or she gives up some current consumption utility, but has the chance of producing o¤spring with the attribute. The resulting utility is (1 ¡¯) u+2 (V A y +V A n ), and consequently he or she would prefer to match with an Ly agent if
The constraint that an Ly prefer to match with Hn rather than another Ly is
i.e.,
Hence, the matching that is perfectly assortative on income and attributes is not stable if and only if
As we indicated at the beginning of this section, it is clear that assortative matching is stable when the attribute is unproductive (k = 0). But the matching is also stable when the attribute is very productive (k > u (1 ¡¯) =¯). In this case, an Ly agent wouldn't want to match with an Hn agent, since the income gain is worth less than the expected sacri…ce in terms of the matching prospects of the o¤spring. Here in a sense, matching is driven primarily by the attribute, and only secondarily by income.
Note also that if u < 1 2 (i.e., agents are risk-loving), then (3.1) must always be violated. In order for the assortative matching to fail to be stable, not only must a high income agent without an attribute be willing to give-up some current utility for the possibility of o¤spring with the attribute, but a low income agent with the attribute must be willing to sacri…ce future utility since the o¤spring may, as a result, not have the attribute.
It is clear that agents with the characteristic Hy never have an incentive to deviate, while Ln agents can never induce a matching from agents with other characteristics. Thus, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 1 Matching assortatively on income and attribute is stable if and only if either¯k
Stable Mixed Matching
The second interesting matching is the mixed matching:
As in the assortative matching, Hy's match with Hy's and Ln's match with Ln's, but unlike that matching, Hn's match with Ly's. The question of stability of this mixed matching immediately arises when the attribute is unproductive: Why would an Hn give up current consumption by matching with an Ly, who contributes less to current consumption than an Hn? Clearly, if the discount factor¯is 0, that is, if parents care only about their personal consumption, mixed matching is not stable: two H n agents would have higher utility by matching together than they would have if they followed the prescribed matching, whether or not other agents follow the mixed matching prescriptions.
However, if parents care about their children, there is a bene…t to an Hn who matches with an Ly when all other agents are following the prescribed mixed matching. An H n's o¤spring will have the attribute with probability 1 2 when matched with an Ly, but with probability 0 if he or she matches with another Hn. While the possession of this attribute doesn't a¤ect the child's income, it does a¤ect who they will match with. An Ly child will match with a high income agent (Hn), while an Ln child matches with an Ln: Consequently, if other agents are following the prescriptions of mixed matching, the attribute has value in a¤ecting o¤springs' matching prospects (and, a fortiori, consumption prospects) even when the attribute is nonproductive. The fact that the attribute has value because of its a¤ect on matching doesn't ensure that the mixed matching is stable of course. Stability will be determined by the trade-o¤ that an H n faces between the lower current consumption that matching with an Ly entails and the expected bene…t it will confer on his or her o¤spring.
The value functions for agents with and without the attribute are denoted V M y and V M n (the superscript M denotes mixed matching). An agent with the attribute has income H with probability ( 1 2 + k); under mixed matching this agent then matches with an identical agent, jointly consumes 2H, and has o¤spring who inherit the attribute with probability 1. An agent with the attribute has income L with probability ( 1 2 ¡ k) and, under mixed matching, matches with an H n agent. Jointly they consume H + L, and their o¤spring inherit the attribute with probability 1 2 . Thus, V M y is given by
and hence,
For the mixed matching to be stable, an Hn agent must prefer to match with an Ly agent rather than match with another Hn agent, and an Ly agent must prefer to match with an Hn agent rather than with another Ly agent. The incentive constraint for an H n agent is
Similarly, the incentive constraint for an Ly agent is
Combining these inequalities, a necessary and su¢cient condition for the mixed matching to be an equilibrium is
Rearranging the inequality and using (3.4), we have the following proposition.
Proposition 2 The mixed matching is stable if and only if
Unproductive attributes
The polar case in which the attribute has no productive value, k = 0, is of particular interest. The corresponding condition for mixed matching to be an equilibrium when the attribute is not productive is
Figure 3.1: For any¯, if u is above the curved line, mixed matching will be stable.
Since u¸1 2 ; the second inequality is satis…ed for all¯2 [0; 1]. Hence, a su¢cient condition for mixed matching to be stable when k = 0 is the …rst inequality, which is equivalent to u¸4 ¡ 32 (2 ¡¯) : (3.8) Figure 3 .1 illustrates the combinations of u and¯for which mixed matching is stable.
Recall that the assortative matching is necessarily stable in the case that the attribute is unproductive. Thus, in the unproductive attribute case, there are multiple stable matchings when this inequality is satis…ed.
These two matchings have di¤erent economic consequences. For the case of balanced transmission, the number of agents with the attribute is independent of the matching, and hence, the distribution of income in the society is independent of the social institutions: half of the society has income H and half has L. However, since consumption within couples is joint, di¤erent matchings may lead to di¤erent distributions of consumption. That the distribution of consumption di¤ers for the two stable matchings described above is clear. Under assortative matching, high income agents always match with high income, and hence, half of the people consume 2H, while the other half consume 2L: On the other hand, in the mixed matching, half of the low income people (those with the attribute) match with high income agents (the high income people without the attribute). Hence, only a quarter of the people consume 2H , a quarter consume 2L, and the remaining half consume H + L.
We now argue that mixed matching Pareto dominates assortative matching when the mixed matching is stable. The binding incentive constraint for the mixed matching to be stable is given by (3.5): an Hn agent prefers to match with an Ly agent rather than match with another Hn agent in this period, assuming that his o¤spring follow the mixed matching. Since the environment is stationary, this constraint is equivalent to the constraint that an Hn agent prefers to follow the mixed matching rather than have all his Hn o¤spring as well as himself match with Hn agents. This latter behavior is almost assortative matching by the Hn agent and his descendants (since the matching behavior of H y and Ln agents in the mixed and assortative matchings agree). Assortative matching di¤ers in that the Ly descendants are matching with H n agents, while in the assortative matching they match with Ly agents. Consider now the payo¤ implications of all Ly descendants matching with Ly agents rather than with Hn agents (when descendants of the other characteristics, Hy, Hn, and Ln, match assortatively). Since the descendants with the other characteristics are ignoring the attribute in matching, this change must lower payo¤s. Hence, an agent with characteristic H n must (weakly) prefer the mixed matching to the assortative matching, when the mixed is stable. This then implies that an agent with characteristic Ly also (weakly) prefers the mixed matching to the assortative matching, when the mixed is stable. (By the above argument, such an agent's payo¤ is reduced if all his H n descendants match assortatively, and reduced even further when all Ly descendants, including himself, match assortatively). This then implies that agents with characteristics Hy and Ln (weakly) prefer the mixed matching to the assortative matching.
It is straightforward to verify by direct computation of the value functions that the converse is also true (see the appendix). We summarize this in the following proposition.
Proposition 3 Suppose the attribute is unproductive (k = 0). The mixed matching (weakly) Pareto dominates the assortative matching if and only if the mixed matching is stable, i.e., inequality (3.8) holds.
The interpretation is straightforward. Higher u corresponds to a more concave utility function over consumption. As in most models similar to ours, the concavity of the utility function is doing double duty, both representing agents' attitude toward risk and their rate of intertemporal substitution. To the extent that more concave utility functions re ‡ect higher risk aversion, the value of the insurance associated with the asset has higher value. Treating concavity as measuring the rate of intertemporal substitution, more concave utility functions increase the bene…t to a high income agent of transferring consumption to his child. In both ways, more concave utility functions are associated with a greater value of the asset. For a …xed¯, if agents' utility functions are su¢ciently concave, regardless of income, agents obtain higher utility under mixed matching than under assortative matching.
The Emergence of Mixed Matching
While the mixed matching on an unproductive attribute is welfare superior when it is stable, it is natural to ask how or why a society might end up with a matching that depends on nonproductive characteristics. Here we brie ‡y outline one possibility: the attribute was at one time productive, and its productivity initially requires mixed matching for stability. At a later time, the attribute is no longer productive, and consequently, matching that ignores the attribute may become stable. Nonetheless, the existing mixed matching for which the attribute matters remains stable.
There is a simple intuition why matchings that don't pair Ly agents with Hn agents may not be stable for with productive attributes (k > 0). When the attribute is su¢-ciently productive, an Hn agent may …nd that the increase in expected income for his o¤spring more than compensates for the decrease in current consumption independent of any change in matching prospects that might also ensue.
We now argue that there are con…gurations of k,¯, and u for which (3.7), (3.8), and (3.1) all hold. Recall that (3.8) is equivalent to
Thus, by choosing u large enough all three inequalities will be satis…ed.
Consider a world in which the attribute is productive (with parameter k), and that all three inequalities are satis…ed. Suppose that in every period there is a small probability p that the attribute becomes unproductive. If p is su¢ciently small, the matching must be mixed in every equilibrium before the attribute becomes unproductive. Moreover, after the attribute becomes unproductive, the mixed matching remains stable. One can interpret this as an explanation as to how nonproductive attributes can be valued. They once had productive value, and the environment was such that matching must take this attribute into account. The eventual disappearance of the productiveness of the attribute does not upset the stability of the mixed matching. 7
Endogenously Changing Social Institutions
One of our primary interests is in how social institutions within a society can change over time. It is often suggested that within some societies, values do change through time, evidenced by the common lament that "people just don't care about the things that used to be important." The analysis above showed that in the unproductive attribute case, both assortative and mixed matching can be stable for some values of the parameters u and¯: One could simply assert that the change in values is captured by a switch from one equilibrium matching to another, but there are objections to this approach.
First, we would like the change in norms in a society to be endogenous, that is, we would like the change to arise from the underlying characteristics of the society. Explanations that simply assume that a society switches from one equilibrium to another rely on explanations that are outside the model. Since the explanations don't come from the model itself, they provide no insight into why the change took place.
A second objection is less conceptual but more serious. For a matching to be stable, there is an incentive constraint that no unmatched pair of agents would prefer to match rather than follow the suggested matching. The calculations in the determination of the incentive constraints assume the matching is permanent. If agents understand that the matching may change in the future, this should be incorporated into the incentive constraints if we wish to maintain our assumption that agents are fully rational.
More concretely, in the mixed matching, Hn agents prefer to match Ly's. An Hn is trading o¤ the present period utility cost of not matching with another H n (and getting higher consumption) with the bene…t of matching with an Ly (and getting a positive probability of o¤spring with the desirable attribute, which will assure those o¤spring higher consumption). The higher expected consumption of o¤spring that compensates for the immediate lower consumption is less valuable if there is a chance that future generations will not "honor" the claim to higher consumption expected for agents with attribute y.
Our approach is to construct an equilibrium in which the matching speci…cation is stochastic, with the change in matching arising from changes in the environment. The basic idea is that, as we showed above, the possibility that a mixed matching is stable depends on the relationship between u and¯. The discount factor¯is …xed, but we introduce income growth into the basic model. A high income agent who matches with a low income agent has lower utility from consumption than if he or she had matched with another high income agent. The utility di¤erence, however, will generally depend on the two income levels. If there is rising income, the "risk premium" an agent will pay to ameliorate the riskiness in future generations' consumption may decrease. If this risk premium does decrease, it may destabilize mixed matching. We illustrate next how this may occur in equilibrium. For simplicity, the discussion in this section is con…ned to the case of unproductive attributes.
We maintain the two-point income distribution analyzed above, but allow the possibility of a one-time income increase that occurs at a random time. 8 (Any change in the income process occurs at the end of a period after matching and before the next period's income is realized; the change is assumed to be common knowledge.) As above, there are initially two income levels, L < H. In each period, with probability p, the income levels increase from (L; H) to (®L; ®H ), ® > 1. Once the higher income level is reached, it remains at that level permanently.
This particular income growth process preserves relative incomes; only the level changes. If the utility function U exhibits constant relative risk aversion, the incentive constraint for stability of the mixed matching will be satis…ed at the initial income level if and only if it is satis…ed at the higher level. 9 This implies that if we introduce stochastic income growth as above with p su¢ciently small, the mixed matching remains stable.
Suppose, however, that the utility function U exhibits decreasing relative risk aversion. In this case the risk premium associated with the random consumption of future generations will be smaller after the income increase than before, and the incentive constraint requiring a type Hn to prefer matching with a type Ly to matching with another Hn may not be satis…ed after the income increase. If this is the case, only assortative matching will be stable after the income increase.
Can it be the case that prior to the income increase the mixed matching can be stable? As mentioned, we maintain rational expectations in the sense that prior to the income increase, the mixed matching must be stable when the agents know that there is a chance that the norm will break down in any period, and hence, that it must break down eventually. Recall that a matching is strictly stable if, for each unmatched pair of agent characteristics, agents with these characteristics would strictly decrease their utilities by matching (taking into account the consequences for their descendants).
Proposition 4 Suppose the attribute is unproductive, the mixed matching is strictly stable for income levels (L; H), and is not stable for (®L; ®H). Suppose income levels begin at (L; H), and in each period there is a probability p of a permanent increase to (®L; ®H). There exists ¹ p > 0 such that for p 2 (0; ¹ p), it is an equilibrium for matching to be mixed while income is at the level (L; H ), and for it to be assortative once income increases to (®L; ®H).
Proof. We denote by V M i (®), i 2 fHy; Hn; Ly; Lng, the value functions for the agents of each type under mixed matching when incomes start at the level (L; H ) and in any period there is a probability p that incomes increase to (®H; ®L), and matching changes to assortative matching at that time (with complementary probability, incomes do not increase and matching remains mixed). Denote by V A i (p), i 2 fH; Lg, the value functions under assortative matching with the higher incomes, (®H; ®L). The equations for the initial value functions V M t (p) are
Since the assortative matching value functions are bounded, as p ! 0, each value function V M t (®) converges to the value function V M t (0), that is, the value functions calculated in the previous section. Hence, since the incentive constraint for the case in which income is unchanging is satis…ed with strict inequality, for su¢ciently low probability p, it will be satis…ed for the case in which incomes increase with probability p.
To summarize: if at the initial income levels, the mixed matching is stable with a strict inequality in the incentive constraint, and if at the increased income level the incentive constraint is not satis…ed, there will be an equilibrium in which matching is based on the mixed matching until incomes increase, at which point the matching must change to the income only ranking.
We can easily generalize this observation to perpetually (stochastically) increasing incomes. In each period there are two income levels. In the …rst period, the incomes are H 1 = H and L 1 = L: In period t, the incomes are (® t H; ® t L), ® t¸1 . As before, the relative wealth levels stay the same but the incomes grow over time. The income factors ® t are stochastic with ® t = ® t¡1 with probability 1 ¡ p 2 (0; 1); and ® t = ® t¡1 +°with probability p. 10 Suppose that the utility function U exhibits decreasing relative risk aversion. Then the value of the insurance to an Hn agent from a match with a high attribute partner is decreasing, and the opportunity cost in terms of forgone current consumption to obtain that insurance is increasing. If at some point, it is not su¢cient to o¤set the immediate utility loss from consumption that results from a match with an Ly agent, mixed matching is not stable, and matching will be assortative. However, if the initial income levels are such that the incentive constraint for stability of mixed matching is satis…ed with strict inequality, then for su¢ciently small p, there will be an equilibrium characterized by mixed matching which will be stable as long as that incentive constraint is satis…ed, and assortative matching after that. Furthermore, if
U 0 (x) ! 0 as x ! 0, then the incentive constraint for mixed matching will eventually be violated with probability one.
This result can be interpreted as the sure eventual demise of social institutions that depend on non-payo¤ relevant criteria when there is asymptotically vanishing relative risk aversion. It is interesting to note that at the point at which the matching regime changes, there may be only a small change in the income distribution, but a large change in the distribution of consumption. Under assortative matching, all high income agents match with other high income people, while in mixed matching, half the high income agents match with low income agents. The collapse of mixed matching is accompanied by a large increase in the variance of consumption.
The General Case
We have thus far focussed on the special case where half the population always had the attribute. We now extend our analysis to more general situations. This includes both balanced transmission (where the probability of transmission in a couple in which one parent has the attribute, ½; equals one half) with nonuniform distribution of attributes (i.e., ¹ = (¹ y ; ¹ n ) 6 = ( 1 2 ; 1 2 )), as well as unbalanced transmission where ½ may be di¤erent from one half. For simplicity, we continue to assume the attribute is nonproductive.
When matching is assortative, either both parents have the attribute, or both parents do not have the attribute. Consequently, the values of ½ and ¹ are irrelevant, and the fraction of the population that has the attribute is stationary. Moreover, when the attribute is nonproductive, the assortative matching is stable.
When matching is mixed, on the other hand, there are many matched pairs in which only one parent has the attribute. Moreover, when ¹ y 6 = 1 2 , there will be di¤erent numbers of agents of characteristic H n and Ly, so that the larger set is rationed. In the mixed matching, all agents in the smaller group match with agents from the other group, and the remaining agents from the larger group are matched with agents with the same characteristics.
We calculate the di¤erence equation describing the evolution of the fraction of the population with the attribute for general ½. Observe …rst that agents with the attribute in period t, in proportion ¹ t y , are equally likely to have high income, H, or low income, L. In terms of keeping track of ¹ t , we can think of each agent being replaced by a single child in the next period. Each agent with the attribute and income H will have a child with the attribute, since the parent is matched with an agent who also has the attribute: Hence, each H y agent (in proportion 1 2 ¹ t y ) has a child with the attribute. Similarly, Ln agents match with the same type and contribute no children with the attribute the next period. If ¹ t y¸1 2 , there are more agents with the attribute than without. Hence, there are fewer H n agents than Ly agents. Consequently, all Hn agents will be in mixed attribute matches, and this group will contribute 1 2 ¹ t n ½ children to the pool of agents with the attribute in the next period. The Ly agents who are in mixed matches with an Hn agent also have probability ½ of having a child with the attribute, hence the contribution from this type to the pool of agents with the attribute next period is 1 2 ¹ t n ½. Finally, the Ly agents who do not match with Hn agents (there are 1 2 (¹ t y ¡ ¹ t n ) of these) will instead match with other Ly agents and have a child with the attribute with probability 1. Summing over these, the proportion of agents with the attribute in period t + 1 when the proportion in period t is ¹ t y ; is
, there are more Hn agents than Ly agents, and so not all Hn agents match with an Ly. Only 1 2 ¹ t y will do so, and only these have the possibility of having a child with the attribute. Agents with characteristic Ln match with agents of the same type and contribute no children possessing attribute y in the next period. Hence the proportion of children with the attribute in period t + 1, ¹ t+1 y , is ¹ t y (
Combining these two cases, we have
(5.1)
We …rst consider the case ½ = 1 2 . Any fraction of the population with the attribute is now clearly a steady state of the dynamic (5.1). We argued at the beginning of Section 3.3 that inequality (3.8) was a necessary and su¢cient condition for the mixed matching to be stable when ¹ y = 1 2 . An important consideration comes into play when ¹ y 6 = 1 2 : If the fraction with the attribute is too large, then an Ly cannot be guaranteed a match with an H n agent, lowering the value of having the attribute. Suppose ¹ y > 1 2 and let ® = ¹ n =¹ y be the probability an Ly agent matches with an H n agent (so that with probability 1 ¡ ®, an Ly matches with another Ly). Then the value of having the attribute is (compare with (3.2) when k = 0)
The value of not having the attribute is still given by (3.3), since H n are not rationed.
Hence,
and so
4 ¡¯¡ ®¯: Stability of the mixed matching still requires that an Hn agent must prefer to match with an Ly agent rather than match with another H n agent, and an Ly agent must prefer to match with an Hn agent rather than with another Ly agent. Consequently, inequality (3.6) (with k = 0) is still the relevant condition. Not surprisingly, since the attribute is not productive, an Ly agent always wants to match with an Hn agent, irrespective of the value of ®. This is not true of Hn agents. Simplifying (3.5) in this case gives the relevant inequality for stability as
which is an increasingly severe restriction on u as ® becomes small (i.e., as ¹ y approaches 1). Intuitively, if ¹ y is too close to 1 (so that ® is close to 0), the matching with respect to income is almost the same as in assortative matching. That is, nearly all Ly's match with agents of the same type, in particular with low income agents. Hence the di¤erence between the expected utility for a child with the attribute and without is arbitrarily small. There is little insurance value in having the attribute, so an H n agent will prefer to match with another Hn agent to matching with an Ly agent: That is, mixed matching is not stable. A similar calculation for the case ¹ y < 1 2 (where now Hn is rationed, while Ly is not), shows that (3.8) is the relevant inequality for stability in this case (as it is when ¹ y = 1 2 ). The logic on Pareto dominance from Proposition 3 applies here as well, so we have:
Proposition 5 Suppose k = 0 and ½ = 
Moreover, when the mixed matching is stable, it Pareto dominates assortative matching.
Unbalanced transmission
We now turn to unbalanced transmission of attributes, which does not preserve the population fractions, i.e., ½ 6 = 1 2 . There are two cases with very di¤erent properties, corresponding to whether ½ is smaller or larger than 1 2 . If ½ < 1 2 , then both parents having the attribute results in a more than proportionate increase in the probability that o¤spring will have the attribute. Consequently, we say that we have economies of scale in the transmission of the attribute. Conversely, if ½ > 1 2 , we have diseconomies of scale.
An example of an attribute that displays economies of scale might be the ability to converse intelligently. If both parents have this attribute, it will be passed on to the children because of the social interactions that occur within the family, while if only one parent has the attribute, then it may be less likely that the child acquires the attribute. On the other hand, if the attribute is the ability to play the piano, it may make little di¤erence in the probability that a child acquires the attribute whether one or two parents possess the attribute.
When ½ < 1 2 , couples in which only one parent has the attribute have a less than even chance of producing o¤spring with the attribute, the fraction of the population with the attribute will decline. The value ¹ = 0 is the globally stable rest point of (5.1). Moreover, in comparison with balanced transmission, the expected value of the insurance received by matching with an Ly agent is reduced, since o¤spring have a smaller probability of acquiring the attribute. Denote by ¹ ¹ the value of ¹ y for which (5.2) holds as an equality. We then have:
Proposition 6 Suppose ½ < 2 ), then the mixed matching is stable. Moreover, the fraction of the population with the attribute converges to 0 and the utility of the representative agent in this matching converges to that of the representative agent in the assortative matching.
The analysis is a straightforward variant of that above, and we simply discuss the intuition for stability. Clearly if the probability of transmission, ½, is too small, the mixed attribute matching cannot be stable. An H n can match with another Hn and get higher utility from consumption, and the continuation payo¤s will be nearly the same as if he matches with an Ly agent.
However, similarly to the stochastically increasing income case analyzed in the previous section, when ½ is su¢ciently close to 1 2 , the value functions will be nearly the same as in the case with ½ = 1 2 : Thus, since the incentive constraint when ½ = 1 2 is satis…ed with strict inequality (by assumption, (3.8) holds strictly), the analogous incentive constraint will be satis…ed when ½ is close to 
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Note that the proportion of agents with the attribute does not go to 0 under all matchings. In particular, under the assortative matching (which guarantees that attributes match with attributes), all children born to parents with the attribute will have the attribute, and the proportion is unchanged over time.
We turn now to ½ > 1 2 , that is, the expected number of children with high attribute coming from mixed matches (matches with exactly one parent with high attribute) is greater than 1. In contrast to the case where ½ < 1 2 , now the value ¹ = 1 is the globally stable rest point of (5.1) and so mixed matching is no longer stable.
Proposition 7 Suppose ½ > 1 2 and k = 0. The mixed matching is not stable. In this case, asymptotically all agents possess the attribute, and we have already seen that the mixed matching cannot be stable in this case. 11 But then the prescribed matching will "unravel," that is, in the period prior to that in which the incentive constraint is violated, no H n will match with an Ly; and hence the same in the period prior to this, and so on. In other words, mixed matching cannot be stable.
It is worth mentioning that it is inconsistent with equilibrium to have initially mixed matching, and then at some time t (when ¹ t y has become su¢ciently close to 1) switch to assortative matching. The large population means that the dynamics on the fraction of the population with the attribute are deterministic, and so the last possible trigger date is common knowledge. But then, as we have just argued, mixed matching will break down in the previous period, and so on.
It is easy to see why mixed matching cannot be stable, since forward-looking agents will see that it cannot forever be stable, hence it will unravel. Here, as in most unraveling arguments, the unraveling is highly sensitive to particular features of the model. If it were not common knowledge that the matching would unravel, it may be stable for a long time and eventually break down in a manner analogous to the situation with bubbles in …nite horizon rational expectations models. Similarly, we could have mixed matching stable if there was a small stochastic component similar to that introduced in the case of endogenously changing social institutions above.
Endogenous Attribute Choice
A central feature of the analysis above is that an attribute may have value in matching both because it has direct productive value and because it has social value, that is, because it enhances matching prospects. If the attribute is productive, agents who possess the attribute are, of course, more attractive mates. While the productive value of the attribute is the same across di¤erent matching rules, the social value is not. If there are investment opportunities available to parents that can a¤ect the chances their children will possess the attribute, the return to the investment will then depend on the social institutions governing matching. Our aim in this section is to demonstrate that social institutions can a¤ect the proportion of agents who possess the attribute, and a fortiori, average income.
We return to the productive attribute case, but allow parents to purchase the attribute for their children if they did not inherit it. We …rst modify the process by which a new generation inherits the attribute from the previous generation. We assume that if both parents have the attribute, both children inherit the attribute with probability 2p < 1 and if one parent has the attribute, both children inherit the attribute with probability p: This speci…cation ensures that the proportion of people in any generation who inherit the attribute is 2p times the proportion of people in the previous generation that had the attribute.
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If no couples purchase the attribute for their children, the attribute asymptotically disappears from the population.
In addition to the possibility of inheriting the attribute, we allow parents to make investments that allow their children to acquire the attribute with positive probability in the event that the child does not inherit the attribute. Speci…cally, we assume that if o¤spring do not inherit the attribute, they obtain the attribute with probability q if parents pay a cost c(q), where c 0 (q)¸0 and c 00 (q) > 0, and c 0 (0) = 0. Parents must fund the investments from current income. The choice of expenditure on attribute is made after the realization of whether the child has inherited the attribute from his or her parents. As before, agents with the attribute have probability 1 2 + k of having high income and those without the attribute have probability 1 2 ¡ k. We are interested in the proportion of parents who purchase education in any period in a stationary equilibrium, and in how that proportion is a¤ected by matching. We provide conditions under which the value of the attribute is higher under mixed matching than under assortative matching. When the value of the attribute is higher, all parents whose children did not inherit the attribute will invest more to increase the probability that their o¤spring will acquire the attribute, and consequently, the proportion with the attribute will be higher. Since the attribute is productive this implies that aggregate income will be higher under mixed matching than under assortative matching.
We …rst describe the steady state under assortative matching. In this case, Hn agents do not match with Ly agents; hence, the value of having the attribute is independent of the proportion of people in the population with the attribute, and so of expenditures on the attribute by other agents. As before, we denote the continuation values of children with the attribute and without the attribute (prior to the realization 1 2 If p = 1 2 and a proportion of parents bounded away from 0 purchase the attribute, asymptotically, all agents will have the attribute. Consequently, for reasons analogous to those outlined in the diseconomiesof-scale case, mixed matching is not stable.
of their income) by V
A y and V A n . The bene…t to parents who purchase probability q of acquiring the attribute for their children is then q(V A y ¡ V A n ), and marginal bene…t is (V A y ¡ V A n ). For k > 0, the marginal bene…t is strictly positive. The marginal cost to parents is the marginal utility of forgone consumption. Hence, for a couple with total income 2H, the marginal cost is U 0 (2H ¡c(q))c 0 (q). This expression is clearly increasing in q, and the couple's optimal q, denoted q A HH , solves
Similarly, the optimal purchases for families with one high and one low income (if there were any) satis…es
; and the choice for families with two low incomes solve
where q A xy denotes the optimal q for a couple whose respective incomes are x and y: It is straightforward to show that, if
These values imply the steady state fraction of the population with the attribute, ¹ A y :
Just as in the productive exogenous attribute case, assortative matching may or may not be stable.
Consider now mixed matching. Under mixed matching, the values of having the attribute are no longer independent of the proportion of people in the population who have the attribute. With mixed matching, an Hn agent matches with an Ly agent if possible. The "if possible" modi…er is necessary since there may not be equal numbers of the two types. When there are more of one than another, some of those on the long side of the market will not be able to participate in a mixed match, and instead will be matched with others of the same type as themselves.
We are interested in understanding when each of the di¤erent matchings is an equilibrium. For mixed matching to be an equilibrium, it must be in the interests of the Hn and Ly agents to match with each other. The incentive constraints for each type of agent to prefer this match to a match with a partner of the same type will depend on the proportion of agents with the attribute, and the expenditures the di¤erent matches will make on the attribute should their children not inherit the attribute. We …rst state the following proposition that there are steady state proportions and expenditures; the proof of the proposition is left to the appendix.
Proposition 8 Let ¹ y be the fraction of the population with the attribute, and q M , 2 fHH; H L; LLg, be the probability that income pair`has purchased, assuming mixed matching. There exist steady state values of ¹ y and q M´¡ q M HH ; q M HL ; q M LL ¢ .
As for assortative matching, we still need to address the stability of mixed matching. We next present two examples in which mixed matching is stable with productive attributes. In the …rst example, assortative matching is also stable and gives a lower per capita income than mixed matching, while it is not stable in the second.
Example 1 The cost function is c(q) = ®q 2 and k = 0. Since k = 0, under assortative matching, no agents will purchase a positive probability of their children acquiring the attribute. We denote by ¹ A y (0) the proportion of agents who have the attribute under assortative matching when k equals 0; since p < 1 2 ; ¹ A y (0) = 0: If mixed matching is stable, the attribute has value and, because c 0 (0) = 0; all couples whose children have not inherited the attribute will purchase positive probabilities of their children acquiring the attribute. The proportion of agents who have the attribute under mixed matching when k equals 0; ¹ M y (0), is strictly positive. Mixed matching may not, however, be stable. For example, if it is very inexpensive for couples to purchase the attribute, an Hn agent will prefer to match with another Hn agent and use the additional family income to purchase high probability of acquiring the attribute to getting probability p of children having the attribute by matching with an Ly agent. However, for su¢ciently high ®; matching with an Ly agent will be more cost e¤ective for an Hn agent to secure a given probability of o¤spring with the attribute than relying on the "after market."
To summarize, if ® is su¢ciently high and k = 0, both positive assortative matching and mixed matching will be stable and ¹ M y > ¹ A y = 0: Furthermore, it is easy to see that ¹ M y is larger for larger p since larger p implies a higher expected number of descendants who will have the attribute.
The value functions V M y and V M n are continuous in k at k = 0: Consequently, if the incentive constraints for mixed matching to be stable are satis…ed with strict inequality when k = 0, they will still be satis…ed for k small enough. Thus, if mixed matching is stable with strict inequalities on matching for k = 0; mixed matching will be stable for positive, but small, k:
In words, more agents have the productive attribute under mixed matching than under assortative matching. In the case of nonproductive attributes, the matching a¤ected the distribution of income in the society, but not the aggregate income. For the productive example described above, matching a¤ects both the total societal income and its distribution.
It is easy to see why mixed matching leads to greater number of agents with the attribute by looking at the problem facing a couple whose child has not inherited the attribute, max q (1 ¡¯)U(l ¡ c(q)) + q¯(V y ¡ V n ) (l is the pair's combined income). The …rst order conditions for this problem are
The left hand side is the marginal utility cost of q, while the right hand side is the marginal bene…t. The marginal bene…t is close to 0 under assortative matching when k is small, but bounded away from 0 for small k under mixed matching due to the "social" bene…ts of the attribute (i.e., the insurance bene…ts the attribute provides).
The greater marginal value of the attribute under mixed matching naturally leads to higher investment in the attribute.
As noted, this example is driven by the higher marginal value of the attribute in the mixed matching equilibrium than in the assortative matching equilibrium, and the attendant higher investments that result from this. We now present a second example in which mixed matching is stable, while assortative is not.
Example 2 We …rst consider the incentive constraints describing a mixed pairing under either assortative or mixed matching (these should be satis…ed for the mixed matching to be stable, and one must be violated for the assortative matching to be stable). Fix a matching, assortative or mixed, and let V y (V n ) denoted the expected utility of an agent with (without) the attribute under that matching. Children from an HnLy match acquire the attribute in two ways: they either inherit the attribute with probability p, or failing to inherit, their parents invest c(q HL ) toward this end. Thus the (unconditional) probability that the o¤spring of matched pairs HnLy have the attribute is p + (1 ¡ p) q HL , which we denote by p HL : Analogously, we denote by p LL = 2p + (1 ¡ 2p) q LL the (unconditional) probability that the o¤spring of matched pairs LyLy have the attribute. An Hn agent prefers to match with an Ly agent if
Analogously, an Ly agent prefers matching with an Hn rather than another Ly agent if
Rearranging (6.1) yields
while (6.2) yields
Mixed matching is stable (and assortative matching unstable) if the two inequalities (6.3) and (6.4) are satis…ed.
For this example, we assume L = 0, H > p (1¡p) , and U 0 (0) = 1, so that two matched low income agents have no money to purchase the attribute, implying q LL = 0 and H ¡ c (q HL ) > 0. Fix ";´> 0 small and assume the cost function satis…es c (q) = ½´q ; q < p= (1 ¡ p) ;
with c 0 (2p ¡ ") = 1, ¹ c < H, and c convex on [0; 2p ¡ "]. These assumptions on the cost function ensure that (for su¢ciently small´, see below) the investment choices for the matched pairs H L and HH satisfy the following inequality:
Note that these inequalities hold under both mixed and assortative matching. Consequently,
and
Hence, the left hand sides of the inequalities (6.3) and (6.4) are positive. Since L = 0; and consequently q LL = 0, the right hand side of (6.4) equals (ignoring the
which is negative, since U (H) > 0 and U(¢)¸0. This immediately gives us (6.4).
Next consider (6.3). We …rst obtain a lower bound on V y ¡ V n that is independent of the behavior of the utility function above H ¡ ¹ c. Note that every paired term in the expression
is nonnegative, so that any term can serve as a lower bound for V y ¡ V n . Suppose the matching under consideration is the mixed matching. The fraction of the population with the attribute ¹ y in steady state is bounded above by 4p(1¡p) (from (6.5)). Note that this bound is independent of the utility function. Thus the probability that an Ly agent is matched with a Hn agent is at least
and with probability p the o¤spring of that match will have the attribute, and so
Thus, (6.3) is implied bȳ
But this is clearly satis…ed by any utility function that displays su¢cient risk aversion. It remains to provide the appropriate upper bound on´(to ensure q HL > p= (1 ¡ p)).
The …rst order condition determining q HL is
Turning to assortative matching, observe that
and so 6.3) is satis…ed (and´is su¢ciently small) when
To summarize, mixed matching is stable for this con…guration of cost function and incomes in the example if the agents are su¢ciently risk averse. At the same time, if the attribute is su¢ciently productive, the assortative matching is not stable. The cost function in the second example was deliberately chosen to have a particular "threshold" form: the cost of acquiring the attribute was relatively low until a point at which it increased steeply. These characteristics of the cost function guarantee that HL couples invest nearly as much as H H couples in the event that their o¤spring do not inherit the attribute. On the other hand, be setting L very low (0 in the extreme case), LL couples can invest little (or none) in the attribute. Under assortative matching, even though there is no social value to the attribute, a mixed matching is pro…table because the concavity of the utility function together with the structure of the cost function imply that the short-run cost for an H n agent of matching with an Ly is dominated by the productiveness of the attribute.
7. Discussion 1. Related literature. Our earlier papers, Cole, Mailath, and Postlewaite (1992) and Cole, Mailath, and Postlewaite (1998) (hereafter CMP) , analyzes a growth model incorporating matching between men and women. In that model, there are multiple equilibria characterized by di¤erent matchings between men and women. The current paper shares with those papers the feature that di¤erent matching arrangements lead to di¤erent economic choices -attribute choice in this paper and savings/bequests there. As we indicated in the Introduction, in contrast to the model here, CMP is interested in matching arrangements that can be supported using personalized punishments. 13 ? analyze a variant of the model in CMP in which each agent's characteristics were not perfectly observable to other agents. In addition to results similar to those in CMP, Corneo and Jeanne show the possibility of societal segmentation in which agents are a¤ected by the characteristics of only a subset of other agents. ? applies the principles of the model in this paper to investigate when the value of tradeable assets may depend on the social institutions of a society.
? analyzes an overlapping generations model in which individuals can invest in a social asset that he calls "culture". Culture has no consumption value in itself, but has positive external e¤ects on the growth rate of an economy. An individual learns culture from an individual who currently has culture, and who charges to teach it. An individual who invests in culture gets no direct bene…t, but is to be able to charge people in the future who wish to invest in culture. In ? model, there is an opportunity cost to learn culture in addition to the transfer to the teacher, and thus, the price of culture must be growing over time. There are equilibria in which culture has a constant price 0 and no one invests in it, but in addition there may be equilibria with "culture bubbles", that is, equilibria in which culture has a positive value, increasing over time. The increase in the price of culture is sustainable because wage incomes rise over time, which in turn is linked to the technological innovations that are generated as an externality of culture. If in some generation no one bought culture, technological progress would cease, and the growth rate of the economy would decrease. The social asset in ? di¤ers qualitatively from ours in that it has direct productive value. While any single individual does not bene…t from the asset in his model, there is a higher rate of growth in economies in which people invest in culture than in economies without such investment. In particular, the culture could not have positive value in ? if it did not lead to technological progress. Fang (2001) analyzes a model in which nonproductive attributes can have value in equilibrium because agents have imperfectly observed ability. Fang demonstrates that high ability agents may acquire a costly nonproductive asset that (in equilibrium) serves as a signal even though the cost of acquiring the attribute is independent of ability. Social assets play an entirely di¤erent role in our model as there is no asymmetric information, hence no role for signalling.
2.
We have analyzed a model in which there is an interaction between the social environment and agents' decisions. Di¤ering social institutions can lead to di¤erences in important economic decisions, and, conversely, agents decisions have important consequences for the stability of the social institutions. Many of the insights the model generates stem from the multiplicity of equilibria. Of course, this is not the …rst paper to point to the importance of multiple equilibria characterized by di¤erent economic choices by agents. Diamond (1970) , for example, demonstrated the link between di¤er-ent equilibria and the level of aggregate economic activity. The nature of multiplicity in this paper, however, di¤ers in an important way. Diamond's multiplicity stems from a complementarity in the production technology: each agent has little incentive to produce when few other agents produce. There is no analogous production complementarity in our model: in the productive attribute case, the productive value of the attribute is independent of the social institutions. The social value, however is not independent of the institutions. Hence, the economic consequences of the multiplicity in our model result from a change in the social return to the attribute rather than through the technology.
3. The example we have analyzed in some detail focuses on income uncertainty and insurance as the conduit through which an asset may have social value. Our point is more general, and to illustrate this, we now describe a simple non-matching example in which a nonproductive attribute can have social value.
In the example, there are overlapping generations of lawyers, each lawyer living two periods. There is a single nonstorable good over which lawyers have identical utility functions, u(c 1 ; c 2 ) = c 1 ¢ c 2 , where c i is consumption at age i. There is a continuum of lawyers born in each period indexed by i 2 [0; 2]. Each young lawyer generates an output of 2 in his …rst period but di¤er in their output in period 2. In period 2, lawyer i can produce i: Each lawyer can go into practice on his own and consume his own output, which generates total utility 2i for lawyer i. Alternatively, a new lawyer can apprentice himself to a "white-shoe" lawyer, who in addition to being a lawyer, has social skills. 14 The social skills have no use in and of themselves, but can be transmitted to others. Each white-shoe lawyer can take on at most 1 apprentice, and a fraction ® of the lawyers are white shoe. At the beginning of each period, each young lawyer who had apprenticed himself to a white shoe lawyer in the previous period becomes a white shoe lawyer himself and makes an o¤er of an apprenticeship to a new lawyer. The o¤ers are take it or leave it o¤ers which will be accepted by young lawyers if and only if their utility will be higher from accepting the o¤er than rejecting the o¤er and practicing on their own. If a second period white shoe lawyer is able to hire an apprentice for a wage w · 2 (the output of all young lawyers), the older lawyer will have a pro…t of 2 ¡ w from the younger lawyer, in addition to his own output.
Consider steady state outcomes, where the fraction of white-shoe lawyers is constant at ®. Since each old lawyer can take on exactly one apprentice, a fraction ® of the young lawyers must accept apprenticeships. Clearly, a wage o¤er of 2 yields an equilibrium in which the social skills have no value, all young lawyers are indi¤erent between accepting and rejecting the o¤ers, and all old white-shoe lawyers are indi¤erent between successfully hiring an apprentice. Consider now a wage of w = ®. We claim that all young lawyers i · ® will accept the o¤ers, and the remainder reject. If a young lawyer with index i accepts the o¤er, his income will be ® in period 1 and his income in period 2 from his apprentice will be 2 ¡ ® (output of 2 less wage of ®). His own output is i (his index), hence his total income in period 2 is 2¡ ® +i, yielding a utility of ®(2 ¡ ® + i). If he rejects the apprenticeship, his income will be 2 in the …rst period and i in the second period, which yields utility 2i. Hence, young lawyer i accepts the o¤er if and only if i · ®.
Thus, there exist qualitatively di¤erent equilibria for this problem. First, there is an equilibrium in which the social skills that is the mark of a white-shoe lawyer has no value. In addition, there is an equilibrium in which social skills have value, and this equilibrium Pareto dominates the equilibrium in which the social skills have now value.
In this example, social value is not driven by risk aversion since there is no uncertainty. Rather, it is driven by the desire to transfer consumption from the …rst period of an agent's life to the second period. As in the model we analyzed, missing markets are key. This example is similar to ? model in that individuals make an investment in learning the social skills that constitute being a white-shoe lawyer, which they can then sell to another lawyer in the future. Our example di¤ers from ? model in that the social skills that are the social asset in the example truly have no productive value. The output of every lawyer in every generation is independent of whether there are any white-shoe lawyers or not.This example also highlights the connection to models of money, since the social skills play the role of a record device, similar to money as memory as described by Kocherlakota (1998) .
4. There is a large literature arguing that institutions such as a functioning legal system and respected property rights can usefully be thought of examples of social capital; more speci…cally, social capital is typically viewed as a "community-level attribute" (Putnam (1994) , Glaeser, Laibson, and Sacerdote (2001) ). From a formal perspective, social capital is best viewed as a characteristic of equilibrium in an in…nite horizon game. The social norms as described in Okuno-Fujiwara and Postlewaite (1995) and Kandori (1992) are prototypical examples. A common feature is that the incentives in these equilibria require the punishment of deviators. Consequently, equilibria exhibiting social capital will not be "Markov."
In contrast, the equilibria we study are Markov. While the particular matching structure (e.g., mixed or assortative) could be thought as an instance of social capital, we think it is useful to distinguish between social institutions which are necessarily sustained by sanctions (which we would term social capital) and those which do not require sanctions. As we noted in the previous point, the stability of both the mixed and assortative matching is driven by anonymous considerations: the attribute has a certain value (which may be zero) and it is irrelevant how that attribute was acquired.
5.
The mixed matching equilibrium is reminiscent of some versions of the theory of sexual selection (Ridley (1993) ). These theories have been motivated by the existence of animals such as peacocks. A nontrivial amount of the peacock's biological resources are invested in long and elegant tail feathers, which serve no productive purpose. Since natural selection selects for the …ttest peacocks (those with shorter tails), there is a puzzle. Why do peahens prefer less …t males (those who have devoted scarce resources to feathers), as they must in order for the less …t males to dominate the population? The explanation is similar to the logic of the stability of the mixed matching in our model. Suppose peahens prefer long-tailed peacocks; then so long as long tails are genetically transmitted to male o¤spring, the male o¤spring of a peahen matched with a long-tailed mate will fare better in the market for mates in the next generation. Hence, there is an advantage to peahens that match with long-tailed peacocks that o¤sets the resources associated with long tails.
Peacocks' long tail feathers are similar to social assets in our model, but the in-centives associated with the matching di¤er. A peahen that mates with a short-tailed peacock will have more o¤spring that survive. However, while a peahen that mates with a long-tailed mate may have fewer surviving o¤spring, the male o¤spring will themselves have more surviving o¤spring due to the advantage long tails confer in the matching process. Thus, selection, which is driving the peahen's choice of mates, is essentially balancing between the genetic advantage of more surviving o¤spring in the next generation and more surviving o¤spring in the subsequent generation. In our model, by contrast, a rich person without an attribute considering matching with a poor person with the attribute is balancing current consumption against descendants' consumption.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 3. Since k = 0, the attribute has no value under assortative matching, and so V A y = V A n = 1 2 . Hence, the utility of a high income agent with the attribute, V A Hy , equals that of a high income agent without the attribute, V A Hn : Under mixed matching, an Hy matches with a similar agent, consumes 2H and has two children, each of whom has attribute y. Hence, the utility of such an agent is
Similarly, an Ln agent will match with an agent of the same type, consume 2L and have two children without the attribute. The utility is The maximizer is unique since U is concave and c is strictly convex. Since the maximizer is unique, it is a continuous function of ¡ ¹ y ; q M ¢ , through the continuity ofṼ y andṼ n . Since © is a continuous function on a compact convex subset of < 4 , there is a …xed point by Brouwer. Note also that in the …xed point,Ṽ y >Ṽ n : Suppose that V y ·Ṽ n . Optimization then implies q M = 0 for all`. But then ¹ y = 0 (since p < 1 2 ), and soṼ n = 1 2 ¡ k (recall our normalization U (2L) = 0). Moreover, ifṼ y ·Ṽ n , V y > (1 ¡¯) f 
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